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1. Introduction  
 
Even though the Asia- Pacific region catches the eye of the globe with its blooming 
economies and gradual liberalizing politics, regional stability is still riven by 
intractable conflicts such as the Korean Peninsula conflict, Indo- Pakistan rivalry and 
South China Sea (SCS) disputes which could threaten the prosperity and security of 
the “Pacific Century” (Jacob Bercovitch & Oishi, 2010, p. 1). Among all conflicts in 
East-Asia, the long- standing SCS disputes have ignited concerns that the area 
represents a “security flashpoint” with global consequences (Singh, 2012, p. 116). The 
increasing danger of this dispute escalating into armed conflict between China and 
other claimants or military confrontation between China and the U.S. has been 
influenced by China’s more assertive claims and more aggressive actions on disputed 
islands, as well as the U.S. “pivot to Asia” strategy since 2010 (Weissmann, 2015, p. 
596). Recently, the tensions have amplified since the U.S. Air Force commenced 
flying daily missions over the SCS, whilst at the same time China keeps building up 
its surface- to- air missiles and fighter jets (The Associated Press, 2016).  
 
The SCS disputes refer to the sovereignty disputes and overlapping maritime 
boundaries disputes over 1.4 million square miles ocean areas in the Pacific Ocean, 
and two major islands-chains - the Paracels and the Spratlys. The People’s Republic 
of China (PRC) and Vietnam both claim the sovereignty over Paracels, whilst claims 
to the Spratlys are contested either entirely or in part by six parties, including Brunei, 
Taiwan, Malaysia, China, the Philippines, and Vietnam (Pham, 2010, p. 428). Due to 
the number of claimants, the complexity of the claims and the wide range of interests 
involved, the SCS has been called the “mother of all territorial disputes” (Beukel, 
2010, p. 9). Although largely uninhabited, the SCS area has abundant fishing and 
natural resources; an estimated 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of 
natural gas (Council on Foreign Relations, 2016) which are vital for future 
development. This is especially true for economies such as China, with huge demands 
for fossil resources and a reliance on imports. Additionally, as the world’s second 
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busiest international sea lane and important trade channel, the total annual trade 
passing through the SCS is around 5.3 trillion dollars per year (Glaser, 2012, p. 4). 
Connecting the Indian Ocean from south, linking the Taiwan Strait to the Pacific 
Ocean, the geopolitical position of the SCS is also of interest to non-claimant states as 
the United States and Japan (Beukel, 2010, p. 9).  
 
Many attempts have been made to solve the disputes in this region by claimant states 
and outside stakeholders through bilateral dialogue or multilateral cooperation 
through both unofficial and official channels. Since 1990, track two unofficial 
multilateral workshops were introduced by Indonesia. Representatives of claimant 
states participated in numerous meetings of technical working groups (TWGs) and 
groups of experts (GEMs) to discuss cooperation and joint development in the SCS 
(Jacob Bercovitch & Oishi, 2010, p. 43). Bilateral talks have been held between the 
main disputants: China and Vietnam, China and Philippines. The 2002 “Declaration 
on the conduct of parties in the SCS” (DOC) signed by Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) members and China could be seen as the first major turning 
point of conflict management in SCS disputes. Following this, China agreed in 2013 
to open the discussion on a Code of Conduct (COC) in the SCS with ASEAN. One 
Chinese scholar commented that “A code of conduct could be signed to keep peaceful 
development but are not documents to settle disputes” (Zhang, 2012). The DOC is an 
important first step to ensure that all parties commit themselves to the exercise of 
general principles like self-restraint (Patalano, 2013, p. 54). However, both DOC and 
pending COC have not made substantial progress mainly due to China’s low priority 
of mechanism building or its unwillingness. There is still a question mark about 
DOC’s regulatory effects on the behavior of claimant states and whether or not it has 
led to the formation of a SCS dispute management regime(Jacob Bercovitch & Oishi, 
2010, p. 44).  
 
Even without committal to the disputes in SCS, the United States maintains vital 
interests in ensuring freedom of navigation and securing sea lines of communication 
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(Council on Foreign Relations, 2016) by using military deterrence to guarantee the 
stability of SCS and limit China’s military expansion. Philippines initially lodged a 
complaint with the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, arguing that China’s 
“nine-dash line” is invalid. Although the Court ruled that it has jurisdiction over this 
case, China boycotted the trail despite its role as a state party of United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Without China’s participation, solving 
the dispute through the international framework faces great obstacles.  
 
New disputes and incidents in the SCS arise time to time, and each risks triggering 
severe military confrontations. Much of the existing literature referring to the conflict 
solutions either focus on solving the disputes through “ASEAN Way”, or how to 
establish a shared maritime regime in this region, or how the big power politics affect 
the disputes. In particular, Buszynski and Roberts (2013) categorized prevailing and 
potential solutions, such as “second track diplomacy”, “third party mediation”, “legal 
resolution”, “joint development” and “cooperative maritime regime”(Buszynski & 
Roberts, 2013). However, the SCS disputes are more than a case of conflict 
prevention or management(Weissmann, 2015, p. 599). The absence of opening 
systematic negotiations both bilateral and multilateral will be the main flaw of any 
potential discussed solutions. Due to the current situation, few official negotiations 
were conducted by relevant countries and even less successful negotiations achieved 
by claimant countries, even though most of these countries openly declared a 
willingness to solve the disputes through bilateral or multilateral negotiations. 
Moreover, few in the literature explore the SCS disputes through the scope of ripeness 
theory, which assumes “ripeness is a necessary condition for the initiation of 
negotiations, bilateral or mediated”(Zartman, 2000, p. 227). Perhaps the big players, 
such as the United States and China, are satisfied with the “unsolved” status quo in 
SCS disputes. Likewise, smaller participants like Vietnam or the Philippines have 
limited power to confront China but retain control over several disputed islands; in 
this sense, maintaining the status quo may be perceived by them as being in their best 
interests. Bateman (2011) pointed out that sovereignty disputes are essentially 
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bilateral issues which could not be resolved on a multilateral basis, and maritime 
boundary disputes are fundamentally political issues which cannot be solved by the 
Law of the Sea but by negotiation between the respective parties (Bateman, 2011). 
Therefore, diagnosing the “Ripeness of SCS disputes” is the first promising step 
towards the conflict resolution of SCS disputes. Ripening the SCS conflict is a key to 
opening negotiations that could reinforce long-term peace and security in the Asia- 
Pacific region.  
 
Therefore, this paper aims to examine two key research questions:  
- Are the SCS disputes ripe for resolution or not? What are the main causes of the 
status quo regarding the level of ripeness in SCS disputes? When is the right time to 
ripen it? 
- What are the roles of China, the U.S. and ASEAN in ripening the SCS disputes 
respectively and collectively? 
 
Sub-research question: 
Does a Zone of Possible Agreement (ZOPA) exist in managing the SCS Disputes? 
 
2. Literature Review  
 
The SCS disputes draw a lot of attention from the academia circle and trigger many 
scholars to search for potential solutions. As an important regional institution, 
ASEAN has played an important role in solving SCS disputes. Majumdar (2015) 
pointed out that the “ASEAN Way” of conflict management is about “a series of 
established guidelines and norms that are meant to be observed by member states”, 
including core norms of “principles of non-interference in internal affairs, peaceful 
resolution of conflicts, and non-use of force”(Majumdar, 2015, p. 74). In his paper, 
Majumdar (2015) argues that the increasing tensions in the SCS are caused by an 
asymmetry of power between China and ASEAN members. Amer (2010) explicitly 
explains the conflict management framework of the ASEAN. The author argues that 
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ASEAN acts in a communicational “vehicle” role to boost the better relationship 
among member states rather than voluntarily or directly offering mediation as a third 
party intervening in the conflict (Amer, 2011, pp. 39–62). Similarly, Ba (2014) points 
out that ASEAN is a vital regional mechanism and confidence-building framework for 
managing relations and disputes(Ba, 2014). 
 
In addition, many ASEAN claimants prefer solving the SCS disputes through the 
international law framework, especially applying the 1982 UNCLOS to these disputes. 
Beckman (2011) argues UNCLOS could apply to the SCS as it regulates certain core 
issues such as regime of islands, the exclusive economic zone and the continental 
shelf. The main focus of SCS disputes is whether China as a party of UNCLOS is 
willing to comply with the UNCLOS or not (Beckman, 2011). The shortcomings of 
UNCLOS could create the potential for overlapping claims in the SCS, further 
reinforcing the disputes rather than the solutions (Rowan, 2005). The same argument 
is mentioned by Song & Tønnesson (2013), who suggest that the conflict-enhancing 
impact of UNCLOS is more salient and substantial than the peace-promotion effects 
(Song & Tønnesson, 2013, p. 235). 
 
A few scholars use conflict management theories as a tool to analyze the SCS disputes. 
Scott (2012) argues that the Track-1 and Track-2 efforts made by ASEAN and China 
only have limited function on conflict management of SCS disputes due to a failure to 
resolve the basic and core sovereignty and control issues. “Balancing” may be the 
most effective management solution in the short term but may generate long-term 
normative changes in the form of Track-2 setting translated into Track-1 government 
movement (Scott, 2012, p. 1020). Weissmann (2015) utilized a conflict transformation 
framework to capture the complex conflict dynamics in the SCS and concluded that 
armed conflict in the SCS is “highly unlikely”. His analysis is based on the 
framework developed by Hugh Miall (2004) who identified five types of 
transformation: context, structural, actor, issue, and personal/elite transformations 
(Miall, Austin, Fischer, & Ropers, 2004). According to Weissmann, from 1991 to 
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2007, incomplete and positive transformations have taken place in SCS; actor 
transformation occurred respectively in China and the U.S. Although Xi’s foreign 
policy is more assertive and promotes “striving for achievement”, the U.S. has 
increased its role as a principal actor, and none of these changes will break the 
balance in this region now. Issue transformation is still in the premature stage but 
there is a tendency through cooperation in non-sensitive issues to improve confidence 
and trust-building. The context and structural transformations are the most salient 
changes due to the signing of DOC and increasing the multilateral cooperation and 
communications between China and ASEAN countries (Weissmann, 2015).  
 
There is one article that links ripeness theory with maritime disputes but the purpose 
of this article is to test the explanatory value of ripeness theory rather than to 
understand how to ripen the conflict. Amer (2004) examined the Zartmarn’s “ripeness 
theory” through review the China and Vietnam conflict from 1970s to 1991 and 
identified “hurting stalemate”, “ripe moment” and “ripe for resolution” as the three 
core concepts of this theory. Applying “ripeness theory” to this case, Amer found that 
none of the core components of ripeness theory could be identified in China and 
Vietnams conflict resolution process but the normalization of bilateral relations 
contributes to the successes of resolution, which means “ripe for resolution” even if 
there was no “hurting stalemate” (Amer, 2004, p. 121). However, this paper only 
focuses on the certain period of a single case study, so the credibility of his results 
should be examined by applying ripeness theory to more cases.  
 
3. Overview of the SCS Disputes  
 
3.1 Geographic Location of SCS  
Geographically, the SCS (Nan Hai in Chinese) is a 1.4 million square mile; 
semi-enclosed marginal sea located South of China which connects the Malacca 
Straits and the Strait of Taiwan. The more accurate limits of SCS were described in 
the document Limits of Oceans and Seas published by the International Hydrographic 
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Organization (IHO) in 1953 (IHO, 1953, pp. 30–31). SCS contains more than two 
hundred insular features, reefs and cays. The main features can be categorized into 
four groups of archipelagos: the Spratly Islands, the Macclesfield bank, the Paracel 
Islands and the Pratas Islands plus the Scarborough Shoal.  
 
3.2 The Evolution of SCS Disputes  
In the “premodern” era, the SCS was a calm area serving as a vital maritime 
communicational trade route connecting China with India, the Gulf, the Middle East 
and even Europe. Islands like the Spratlys and Paracels were marked by cartographers, 
but mainly to indicate their navigational danger to sailors in the region. (Till, 2009, p. 
27). While the SCS disputes have been ongoing since the late twentieth century, the 
historical origins of disputes could be dated back to the colonial periods. The western 
colonial powers initially brought the concepts of ‘sovereignty’ and ‘freedom of 
navigation’ to this region, implying a crucial distinction between land and sea 
(Tønnesson, 2002, p. 8). The coming of the Japanese power in the late 19th century 
challenged the traditional European domination in Asia Pacific. In order to restrain 
this Japanese expansion, France increased its interests both in Spratlys and the 
Paracels through occupying islets and establishing a permanent presence during 
1930-1938 (Tønnesson, 2002, p. 10). Without active resistance from France, Britain 
or the U.S., Japan enlarged its military presence both in Spratlys and Paracels and 
launched sovereignty claims on these two archipelagos, resulting in French and 
Japanese troops living side by side in the Spratlys and Paracels during the much of the 
Second World War period (Tønnesson, 2002, p. 10). During the post-European period, 
the sovereignty of the islands were still not strategic priorities for the regional powers, 
but by the end of 1946 both China and France began to reassert their sovereignty 
claims with “low level campaigns” (Till, 2009, p. 30). As the most active claimant at 
that time, the Republic of China (Chiang Kai-shek’s government) published a map 
with a dotted U-shaped line covering the whole SCS in 1947-48 (Tønnesson, 2002, p. 
11).  The San Francisco Peace Treaty came into force in 1952; the defeated Japan 
renounced the right, title and claim to the Paracel and Spratly Islands (Chen, 2014, p. 
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169). The treaty left the actual ownership of the islands unclear, inadvertently leaving 
room for the disputes that we see today. However, some scholars also argue that this 
vague settlement was indeed done on purpose by the U.S.(Hara, 2007) Under the 
background of decolonization and the cold war, the emerging independent countries in 
the region began to take part in the ownership campaign over the disputed islands. 
Furthermore, the changing power in this region and the confrontation between 
capitalism and communism made the disputes more salient. The disputed islands of 
the SCS began to be seen as “a potential battleground in the struggle between the 
Communist and the West bloc” (Till, 2009, p. 31). Decolonized states like the 
Philippines (1946) and Vietnam (1950) started to make sovereignty claims over the 
Spratlys and Paracels. The year of 1956 was described by Tønnesson (2002) as a 
decisive year in the SCS, in which the combat for islands ownership was revitalized. 
The Philippine maritime activists the Cloma brothers alleged the sovereignty over the 
Kalayaan area (Freedomland) triggered the protest and counter-claims from other 
parties (Tønnesson, 2002, p. 13). The same year, Taiwan sent troops to expel the 
Filipinos and returned to Itu Aba (Taiping Island, the largest of the Spratly Islands). In 
1971, the Philippines officially declared the Kalayaan area as part of its territory. The 
South Vietnamese and the PRC both claimed sovereignty over the Spratlys and the 
Paracels and the tension ended with the PRC military occupying the Paracels in 1974. 
Till (2009) argues that during the post-cold war period, the SCS disputes “reverted to 
being ‘just’ a regional rather than a global issue, albeit one that still had potentially 
widespread consequences” (Till, 2009, p. 33). The clash and tension between China 
and Vietnam broke out three times respectively in 1988, 1994 and 1995, ending with 
Chinese occupation of Johnson Reef and Mischief Reef.  
 
The other major historic development was the launch of the 1982 UNCLOS which is 
referred to as the ‘constitution of the oceans’ (T.B. Koh, 1983). All claimant states in 
SCS disputes are state parties of UNCLOS. Rothwell (2015) argues that “UNCLOS 
remains the dominant international law of sea instruments that identifies the scope and 
extent of various maritime zones, and also provides mechanisms for the delimitation 
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of maritime boundaries” (R.Rothwell, 2015, p. 46). There are several vital concepts 
initially discussed in the UNCLOS which were adopted by some claimant countries 
for their sovereignty claims. For example, the “territorial sea” is “up to a limit not 
exceeding 12 nautical miles” (UNCLOS, Article 3) and “the sovereignty extends to 
the air space over the territorial sea as well as to its bed and subsoil” (UNCLOS, 
Article 2). The “Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)” is the area that extends 200 
nautical miles from the baselines (UNCLOS, Article 57). Most importantly, within the 
EEZ the coastal states enjoy full sovereignty rights such as “exploring the natural 
resources”, “establishing and using of artificial islands” and “the protection and 
preservation of the marine environment” (UNCLOS, Article 56). The UNCLOS also 
gives a clear definition of “the continental shelf”, which extends the range from 
minimum 200 nautical miles to maximum 350 nautical miles on a case-by-case basis 
(UNCLOS, Article 76). The sovereignty rights of costal states are similar to the 
entitlements that they enjoy in their EEZ (UNCLOS, Article 77). Although under the 
UNCLOS maritime entitlements are endowed to coastal countries, this entitlement is 
generated only by land territory or islands (Beckman, 2013, p. 142).  
 
3.3 Each Party’s Claims and the Status quo of Occupation  
Of the eight bordering parties in the SCS, only Singapore and Indonesia have no 
claims over the disputed islands. The other six parties, which are People’s Republic of 
China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines contest for territory or 
jurisdiction over the SCS.  
 
People’s Republic of China (China) is one of the most assertive claimants of SCS 
Disputes. China argues it enjoys indisputable sovereignty over the Spratly and 
Paracels and the adjacent waters by providing historical facts that China was the first 
country to discover and name the islands group in SCS in the third century BC (Wu, 
2013, p. 15). However, until 1949 China continued to use the U-shaped line inherited 
from the previous Republic of China government to declare its ownership over the 
entire SCS. As key basis of China’s claim, the U-shaped line is an important concept, 
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also known as the ‘nine-dotted line’, ‘nine dash line’ and ‘China’s traditional 
maritime boundary line’ in diverse sources (Wu, 2013, p. 77). In February 1948, the 
Geography Department in the Ministry of Internal Affairs officially published The 
Administrative Division Map of the Republic of China which marked the 
eleven-dotted line around the Pratas Islands, the Paracel Islands, the Macclesfield 
Bank and the Spratly Islands with the southernmost line around about the 4 degree 
northern latitude (Li & Li, 2003, p. 290). People’s Republic of China inherited this 
map but the officials eliminated two lines in 1953 due to the concession to Vietnam in 
the Gulf of Tonkin, after which the U-shaped line was described as the nine-dotted 
line. The main flaw of China’s “U-shaped line” falls on its ambiguity and 
contradiction towards the main principles of UNCLOS. Lacking any official 
explanations of what is China’s claim within the U-shaped lines and with only vague 
descriptions of where baselines lie, it is arguable whether China claims islands or sea 
territory within the line, or whether it represent the exact boundaries of its claim 
(Buszynski, 2015, p. 7). There is no official announcement about the number of 
islands that are occupied by China. China took full control over the entire Paracel 
Islands from Vietnam in 1974 and it is estimated that China occupies approximately 8 
to 11 of the Spratly Islands (US-EIA, 2013), (Task Force for Marine Affairs, 
Executive Yuan, ROC & (Taiwan), 2016).  
 
As the first claimant making its territorial claim over the SCS, Taiwan shares the 
same territorial claim with China, deeming all the islands within a U-shaped line to be 
its historical waters in which it has preferential rights (Lin, 1997, pp. 323–324). 
Taiwan has effective control over the Itu Aba (Taiping) Island, the largest island of 
the Spratlys and Pratas Islands. Since the P.R.C. replaced Taiwan’s legal position in 
United Nations in 1971, Taiwan has had limited capacity to claim or protect its 
demands. As Taiwan is an inseparable part of China due to the “one China policy”, 
China demonstrates a tolerance towards Taiwan’s occupation in the SCS as a de facto 
extension of its own area of control.  
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Since 1975, unified Vietnam also claims sovereignty over the Paracels (Hoang Sa) 
and Spratlys (Truong Sa) on the basis of historical evidence, economic development, 
effective administration and international recognition (Pedrozo, 2014, p. 37). The 
Vietnamese government issued three White Papers in 1979, 1981 and 1988 
respectively to prove its peaceful and continuous acquisition and effective 
administration over the disputed islands on a historical and legal basis (Hai, 2015, p. 
83). The main weakness of Vietnam’s claim is that North Vietnam (Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam) publicly supported China’s sovereignty over the Paracels and 
Spratlys although its position changed in 1974 (Wu, 2013, p. 86). Among all 
claimants in this region, Vietnam occupies the largest number of Spratly islands, 
around 21 to 24 features in the early 1990s (M. J. N. Valencia, Dyke, & Ludwing, 
1997, p. 33).  
 
The Philippines dispute in the SCS is principally with China in Scarborough Shoal, 
Second Thomas Shoal, Reed Bank and a variety of features in the Spratlys, also 
contested with Vietnam and Taiwan (Rosen, 2014, p. 1). The Philippines’ arguments 
are based upon the interpretation of UNCLOS and its practice rather than historical 
evidence. The main resources supporting its claim are ‘discovery’ by the Cloma 
brothers (1956) and non-illegal occupation after the San Francisco conference (Wu, 
2013, p. 127). The Philippines hold around 11 of the Spratly Islands (Task Force for 
Marine Affairs, Executive Yuan, ROC & (Taiwan), 2016).  
 
Malaysia and Brunei joined in the SCS disputes over the Spratlys in the 1970s. 
Malaysia claims 11 maritime features in the Spratlys and occupies 8 of them, with the 
other three being occupied by Vietnam or the Philippines (Parameswaran, 2014, p. 4). 
The basis of Malaysia’s claim is the continental shelf principle of UNCLOS and it 
also has clear defined coordinates. As the most low profile claimant country in SCS 
disputes, Brunei claims a 12-mile territorial sea, a 200-mile EEZ and a continental 
shelf (United Nations, 2011), with the Rifleman Bank and the Louisa Reef as the 
center of its claim. Brunei’s claims are contradictory to Malaysia’s claims, but so far 
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without any military confrontation the conflict is mild.  
 
Overall, the claimant states assert their territorial claims and/or maritime entitlements 
by providing historical evidence and/or quoting the principles from UNCLOS. 
However, no single claimant has incontrovertible arguments for their claims. The 
colonial history complicates the disputes due to unclear cessions after liberating the 
colonies; some islands were abandoned by the colonial power and neighboring 
countries started to compete with each other over the territorial issues. The SCS 
disputes are not the only regional issues left over from history but are the issues most 
influenced by the UNCLOS. The principle of EEZ or continental shelf changes the 
scope of one country’s maritime territorial and its maritime entitlements. The different 
interpretations of UNCLOS also create the problem of overlapping claims. 
  
3.4 Intractable Nature of SCS Disputes 
It is necessary to diagnose the disputes before undertaking any further analysis of the 
ripeness of the SCS disputes. As mentioned in the introduction, the disputes in the 
SCS are very complex, involving multiple issues and several parties. There is no 
doubt that SCS disputes are intractable and destructive, which “over an extended 
period of time, are characterized by ever-present tension and violence and are arenas 
for many futile attempts at management or resolution” (J Bercovitch, 2005, p. 101). 
Zartman (2005) combined five internal characteristics to identify intractable conflicts: 
“protracted time, identity denigration, conflict profitability, absence of ripeness and 
solution polarized” (Zartman, 2005a, p. 48). The five elements of intractable conflict 
are all present in the SCS disputes. The SCS disputes have existed for several decades; 
the numerical duration is long enough to be “intractable”. Besides, protraction is 
self-reinforcing which means the durations could also create more hurdles during the 
conflict that increase to the difficulty of treating them (Zartman, 2005a, p. 49) When 
China started its diplomatic relations with the Southeast Asian countries in the 1970s 
and 1980s, Chinese Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping proposed the idea of “setting aside 
dispute and pursuing joint development” in dealing with the disputes in Spratlys 
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(Chinese MFA, 2014). Although a short period of “silence” and development was 
brought about by this “intentional delay”, the prolonged conflict became far more 
complicated and intractable with the rise of Chinese power, the creation of UNCLOS 
and the U.S.’s subsequent return to Asia. The disputes in the SCS are not static, 
constantly evolving and reinforcing over the course of each dispute. The second index 
of intractable conflict is identity denigration. The “identity” in intractable conflict is 
not only polarized but also is dependent on defamation of the other party (Zartman, 
2005a, p. 50). In SCS disputes, identity issues could be translated into nationalism in 
disputed countries. These territorial disputes often ignite nationalistic sentiment. For 
example, through vocal decrees, executive orders and naming the “West Philippine 
Sea” the Philippines government purposely strengthens nationalistic tendencies in the 
Philippines over the disputes with China (Dor, 2015). The frequent popular 
demonstrations against China’s maritime claims in the Philippines since 2012 indicate 
how the polarized “patriotic Filipino” identity augments the intractable nature of the 
conflict. The anti-China slogans which the Filipino used in protest represent the 
denigration of China’s image. The third index is profitability, which means someone 
profits from a given conflict (Zartman, 2005a, p. 51). A commonly forgotten 
characteristic, profitability also exists in the SCS disputes. It is hard to say who has 
the greatest vested interests in the SCS disputes, but the big players like China and 
U.S. do benefit from ongoing conflict. China lacks the full capability to achieve its 
maritime claims within the U-shaped lines, but by “shelving the issue” it buys time to 
develop its economy and gradually enlarge its occupation via building artificial 
islands. The rising China challenges U.S. hegemony not only in the global sphere but 
especially in Asia Pacific region. As long as the disputes continue U.S. could maintain 
its presence as the ally of the Philippines or in the name of Freedom of Navigation to 
deter China without direct military confrontation. The fourth index is the absence of 
ripeness, defined as “ a pressure toward negotiation that tends to be absent in 
intractable conflicts” (Zartman, 2005a, p. 52). The more elaborated analysis of 
ripeness in SCS will be explained in the later part, but to be sure that the SCS disputes 
fall in the trap of “stable, soft, self-serving (4-S) stalemate that is preferable to any 
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attainable solutions and the uncertainties of a search for them” (Zartman, 2005a, p. 52) 
rather than a Mutual Hurting Stalemate (MHS). There are neither feasible agreements 
supported by all claimant states nor any successful bilateral solutions at this time. 
However, without severe military confrontation, a soft stalemate in a low level 
conflict is still bearable to all the parties in SCS. Small clashes occur from time to 
time but never escalate into military confrontation and all parties respect the 
self-restraint principle to some degree. For instance, in 2011 a Chinese frigate fired 
warning shots at a Philippine fishing boat near Jackson, whilst in the same year there 
was a clash between a Vietnamese oil and gas survey ship and three Chinese patrol 
vessels (van Ham, Montesano, & van der Putten, 2016, p. 7). Unprecedented 
anti-China protests in Vietnam did not change the status quo of the 4-S stalemate. 
Sometimes in a 4-S stalemate, only one party senses the pressure to seek a solution 
instead of operating on both parties (Zartman, 2005a, p. 52). In 2013, the Philippines 
submitted its case to the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) against 
China’s territorial claims within the U-shaped line. However, China will be in 
disadvantage position due to lack of strong argument defending its claims via third 
party arbitration thus China directly refused this option. In addition, in a 4-S stalemate, 
parties do not have any motivations or pressures to come to a complete resolution but 
there may be an incentive to reduce the cost without touching upon the basic issues 
and underlying causes (Zartman, 2005a, p. 53). The agreement on the DOC between 
ASEAN countries and China is a good example of management that does not touch 
upon the core issue of territorial disputes. In this sense, the signing of the DOC 
reduces the pressure for territorial dispute settlement and so further contributes to 
intractable nature of SCS disputes. The last index is solutions in intractable conflicts 
also tend to be polarized (Zartman, 2005a, p. 53). It is obvious that the territorial 
disputes are extremely polarized; parties have competing claims on the same islands 
or on the overlapping maritime zone that make it almost impossible for any party to 
compromise on sovereignty issues.  
 
The SCS disputes demonstrate the characteristic of an “absence of violence” (Galtung, 
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1969, p. 183) in the past three decades which can be defined as a “negative peace” 
(Galtung,1969). However, behind the fragile and tenuous peace, these disputes are 
dominated by zero-sum thinking; each party’s interests are polarized. Despite this, 
Brendan (2014) argues that “ the SCS is not an increasingly perilous Asian security 
flashpoint” mainly because these disputes are less dangerous than other traditional 
Asian security flashpoints such as Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula, and the East China 
Sea (Brendan, 2014, p. 100). Although there is no head on military confrontation 
among claimant countries in this area, the unsolved disputes are hidden time bombs 
with increasing tensions. China still values SCS as one of its national core interests 
and is gradually increasing its presence and management in this area. The other 
claimant countries never give up their requests and are similarly becoming more 
active. Furthermore, the U.S. retains a strong military presence in the region with its’ 
strategic “pivot to Asia”. All these uncertain factors continually pile up pressures on 
the regions security.  
 
3.5 Categorized the SCS Disputes  
The disputes in SCS are not single territorial disputes but intertwine with many other 
issues. A lot of the literature neglects the diversity of issues in this dispute that are 
meaningful for the resolution. Obviously, claimant countries not only have different 
demands but also hold divergent attitudes towards different issues in SCS disputes. 
Correspondingly, solving different issues requires flexible solutions. Therefore, in this 
research except for viewing the SCS disputes as a single integrated complicated issue, 
I will also dissect the disputes into three different categories: territorial disputes, 
resources disputes and jurisdiction disputes. First of all, territorial disputes are the 
most intractable ones, tightly related to each country’s core interests. These types of 
disputes could be described as “hard issues”. China strongly declares that it has 
“indisputable sovereignty over the SCS Islands”(MFA of China, 2014) which 
indicates to some degree that territorial issues are the most “non-negotiable”. The 
territorial disputes also ended in the violent conflicts between Vietnam and China in 
1974 and 1988, as well as igniting the 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff. Therefore, as 
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the root cause of the SCS disputes, territorial issues are the most fundamental and 
difficult issues. Secondly, one of the key drivers of the dispute is competition over the 
region’s natural resources by littoral countries (Fabinyi, 2015). According to the data 
estimated by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) in 2013, the SCS 
reserves approximately “11billion barrels oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas 
in proved and probable reserves”(EIA, 2013). Besides oil and natural gas, potential 
value of fishery and aquaculture resources also triggered severe competitions from 
claimant countries. The SCS accounts for one-tenth of the world’s global fisheries 
catch, and plays host to a multi-billion dollar fishing industry (Pitlo, 2013). Small 
clashes occur frequently over competition for fishery resources. However, it is still 
possible to negotiate and cooperate on natural resource issues. For example, in 2000 
China and Vietnam signed the “Agreement on Fishery Cooperation in the Beiyu 
(Tokin) Gulf”. Derived from resource issues, environmental protection is also a 
possible cooperation field of SCS disputes. For instance, Oil companies from China, 
Philippines and Vietnam signed the "Agreement for Joint Marine Seismic 
Undertaking on Certain Areas in the SCS" in 2005 (Chinese Embassy in Philippines, 
2009). Therefore, resource disputes have a potential to be negotiated among parties 
but there remains a potential spillover of tension into military confrontation or 
upgrading into territorial disputes. The third one is the jurisdictional disputes, which 
are intertwined with the territorial. All claimant countries are the parties of the 1982 
UNCLOS which is the dominant international legal instrument to identify maritime 
zones and provide dispute settlement mechanisms for the delimitation of maritime 
boundaries (Rothwell, 2013, p. 14) In 2013, the Philippines brought China before an 
Arbitral Tribunal under the UNCLOS. Chinese scholar Wu Shicun comments that the 
tribunal ruled that it had jurisdiction over this case as “illogical, unfair, and risks 
escalating tensions in the SCS”(Wu, 2016). As an outside player who does not have 
direct claims in SCS, U.S. has its interests in this region and utilizes international law 
as a legal basis to assert its rights of freedom of navigation (FON). However, FON 
has been seen as a military deterrence tool by China which deployed by the U.S. to 
curb China’s military expansion in the SCS. These jurisdictional disputes also have 
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the potential to escalate tensions among claimant countries. 
 
4. Theoretical Framework 
 
Ripeness is the “existence of the prerequisites for diplomatic progress, that is, 
circumstances conducive for negotiated progress or even solution” (Haass, 1992, p. 6). 
An absence of ripeness explains why diplomats fail (Haass, 1990, pp. 138–9). 
Ripeness is by no means a new concept in diplomacy or negotiation theory; forty 
years ago John Campbell proposed that “ripeness of time is one of the absolute 
essences of diplomacy… you have to do the right thing at the right time” (Campbell, 
1976, p. 73). Timing is an essential consideration for any mediator preparing for 
intervention (Wilkenfeld, 2006, p. 139). The concept of ripeness is best illustrated by 
comparing a negotiation to picking fruit; “If a fruit is picked up too early, it will not 
be ready for eating; however, if it is picked too late, it will be inedible as well” 
(Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado, 1998, p. 1).  
 
Pruitt summarized several core components of ripeness which were further specified 
by Zartman (1996): hurting stalemate, impending catastrophe, enticing opportunity, 
valid spokesman, and perceived way out (Pruitt, 1997, p. 248). According to Zartman, 
the parties’ perception of a Mutually Hurting Stalemate (MHS) is at the core of 
identifying ripeness; only when parties find the deadlock too painful will they start to 
seek an alternative policy or Way Out (Zartman, 2001, p. 8). The logic behind the 
ripeness theory suggests that MHS acts as a “push” power to open or start 
negotiations whilst Way Out provides an attractive incentive to “pull” parties into a 
possible solution. Once negotiations have begun under the pressure of MHS, the Way 
Out transforms into a Mutually Enticing Opportunity (MEO), where parties are 
motivated by a resolving formula to reach an agreement (Zartman, 2007b, p. 232). By 
contrast, ripeness as a pressure tends to be absent in an intractable conflict; instead of 
MHS pushing the parties into a search for solutions, there is only a stable, soft, 
self-serving (4-S) stalemate that is preferable to any attainable solutions and the 
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uncertainties of a search for them (Zartman, 1996)(Zartman, 2005b, p. 52). Different 
parties may have diverse perceptions of the stalemate, and a simultaneous sense of 
stalemate is not easily achieved. The MHS and the Way Out are both subjective 
perceptions for each party and are therefore potentially sensed by parties at “any point 
in the conflict” (Zartman, 2007b, p. 234). In addition, ripeness can be an extremely 
“fleeting opportunity”, either seized or lost amidst a “long duration period” which 
have to be identified or activated by mediators (Zartman, 2007b, p. 234).  
 
This paper will also take into account the critics of ripeness theory, such as Kleiboer 
(1994) who argues “ripeness ultimately appeals to the willingness of the main parties 
and factions within the parties (especially their powerful leaders)” (Kleiboer, 1994, p. 
115). Kleiboer suggests that “complete willingness” of all parties is a minimum 
threshold for a peaceful settlement but not a sine qua non (Kleiboer, 1994, p. 115). In 
this sense, “willingness” could be an important index for diagnosing how China’s 
reluctance to solve disputes through multilateral platforms or international tribunals 
may affect a disputes’ resolution, or why some claimant states appear more eager to 
solve the disputes. Zartman (1983,1986), Haass (1988), and Stedman (1987) all argue 
that a conflict has to be ripe if it is to be feasible for resolution, and thus identifying 
the ripe moment during the conflict process is the key to a successful conflict 
resolution (Kleiboer, 1994, p. 109). A party’s willingness could be testified under the 
indexes “Way Out” and “MEO”. It is important to note that violence is not the 
necessary condition for ripening (Achankeng I, 2012, p. 54). Likewise, ripening is not 
a linear process; rather it is dynamic and sometimes cyclical, suggesting that there is 
often a future possibility to create a “ripe moment” should one be missed (Kleiboer, 
1994, p. 111).  
 
Haass emphasized that ripeness theory “as an analytic tool… helps to explain why 
agreements can be reached in certain situations, but not in others” (Haass, 1992, p. 7) 
As early as 1985, Zartman initially identified the concept of ripeness whilst 
examining conflicts in Africa in his book Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and 
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intervention in Africa (Zartman, 1985). Haass (1990) explored the crucial role that 
ripeness plays in terminating the conflicts in Middle East case, Greece, Turkey, and 
Cyprus, India and Pakistan, North Ireland(Haass, 1990). Similarly, Michael E. Salla 
applied ripeness theory to the East Timor conflict (Salla, 1997), while Ramses Amer 
published a series of articles assessing the explanatory value of Zartman’s Ripeness 
theory: The Resolution of the Cambodian Conflict (Amer, 2007) and Explaining the 
resolution of the China-Vietnam conflict (Amer, 2004).  
 
Hypothesis one to five is derived respectively from the proposition of Zartman’s 
ripeness theory, which are: 
 
-An MHS contains objective and subjective elements, of which only the latter are 
necessary and sufficient to its existence (Zartman, 2000a, p. 229). 
 
- If the parties’ subjective expressions of pain, impasse, and inability to bear the costs 
of further escalation, related to objective evidence of stalemate, data on numbers and 
nature of casualties and material costs, and/or other such indicators of an MHS can 
be found, along with expressions of a sense of a way out, ripeness exists (Zartman, 
2000a, p. 231). 
 
- The perception of a mutually enticing opportunity is a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition for the continuation of negotiations to the successful conclusion of a conflict 
(Zartman, 2000b, p. 243). 
 
Hypothesis 1: Lack of ripeness in the SSC disputes makes the bilateral and 
multilateral diplomatic efforts fail, these diplomatic efforts aimed at opening 
negotiations rather than ultimately solving the disputes.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Lack of MHS in SCS disputes is not because the objective condition is 
not salient enough for disputant parties but is rather due to the deficiency of subjective 
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perceptions of claimant countries.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Unwillingness of each party to negotiate on South China Sea disputes is 
the main obstacle of opening negotiations. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Only when each party in the SCS dispute perceives a MHS (largely 
through de facto objective evidence of heavy costs), combined with a willingness to 
seek a way out, does ripeness exist. 
 
Hypothesis 5: ASEAN has failed to induce ripeness in SCS disputes due to a lack of 
capability to stimulate the MEO perceptions of claimant countries.  
 
4.1 Operationalization 
In order to identify ripeness in SCS disputes, I will utilize core components of ripe 
moment to evaluate whether the SCS disputes are ripe or not. The first index will be 
the mutual hurting stalemate (MHS), including parties’ objective spend and subjective 
perceptions. According to Zartman, a ripe moment centers on the parties’ perception 
of a MHS, ideally combined with an impending catastrophe (Zartman, 2000a, p. 228). 
A current and impending catastrophe can not only offer a time pressure but also 
sharply increases a party’s perceived pain (Zartman, 2007b, p. 232). Stalemate can be 
described as a “Plateau” with “unending terrain without relief”, while the catastrophe 
could be seen as a “Precipice”; a moment or point where “things suddenly and 
predictably get worse” (Zartman, 2007b, p. 232). The logic and reasoning behind the 
MHS is the “cost-benefits” analysis which posits that parties will seek an alternative 
solution to rid themselves of a disadvantageous position once they realize they are 
trapped along a pain-producing path (Zartman, 2007b, p. 232). Aside from evaluating 
the subjective elements of SCS, it is also important to identify the objective elements 
of MHS such as actual cost, which will offer an angle into what elements may sculpt a 
party’s perception. Even when both parties share the perception of a MHS, “mutual 
does not imply symmetry” (Zartman & Soto, 2010, p. 13). In this sense, parties may 
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sense a different degree of pain from the stalemate and thus a different level of 
willingness to negotiate. Zartman & Soto (2010) listed objective and subjective 
indicators that could be utilized to analyze the costs that produce pain. Objective 
indicators include the “relative cost”, “opportunity cost”, “losses as a sign of pain”, 
“changes in leadership”, “changes in allies” (Zartman & Soto, 2010, pp. 13–16). All 
these indicators are useful tools to identify the objective evidence for the presence of a 
MHS but it is not necessary for all stalemate ingredients to exist (Zartman & Soto, 
2010, p. 18). The more indicators that exist and the more salient the indicators are, the 
more effective they can be at triggering the perception of a painful impasse (Zartman 
& Soto, 2010, p. 18). The functions of identifying the objective indicators are to 
determine if the stalemate exists and assess the degree of pain for each party. As a 
necessary condition of MHS, subjective indicators could be the “evaluation the hidden 
message of the official statements” or “assessment of unofficial statement in public 
media” (Zartman & Soto, 2010, p. 18-19). On the one hand, subjective indicators are 
derived from objective indicators, but on the other, the subjective perception of MHS 
may exist even without presenting the objective indicators (Zartman & Soto, 2010, p. 
18).  
 
The second index will be party perceptions of Way Out and MEO (Zartman, 2000a, p. 
228). Way Out does not indicate the promising outcome or detailed prescription, 
rather it represents the positive perception and willingness of the party to realize 
negotiation is an alternative solution for the conflict and that the parties are willing to 
seek joint solutions. Way Out parallels MHS, however MHS is a necessary but 
insufficient condition to initiate negotiation. It is more important that negotiation 
appeals to all claimant parties as a possible remedy for the dispute, offering both 
attractive and promising solutions. In order to trigger the negotiation, the push factor 
“MHS” has to be taken over by “Way Out” as a pull factor on the condition that 
negotiating parties design a “formula for settlement” and “prospects of reconciliation” 
(Zartman, 2000b, p. 242). Way Out is still a vague perception; part of the initial 
ripeness which needs to be elaborated and specified in order to become the “vehicle 
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for an agreement” (Zartman, 2000b, p. 242). Therefore, the vital condition for parties 
in conflict to stay committed to the negotiation process is a sense of MEO. Without 
MEO, even agreements already reached cannot be guaranteed to keep negotiations 
smooth and stable (Zartman, 2000b, pp. 242–243). MEO could be considered as a 
more attractive new alternative for a party to purse its interests and advance its status 
quo in a manner only obtainable by cooperating through negotiations. As an important 
concept to enlarge the explanatory sphere of ripeness theory, MEO is a bridge to link 
the “agreement and post agreement phases”(Zartman, 2007b, p. 236). The 
replacement of MHS by MEO results in a transformation from “negative” ripeness 
towards “positive” ripeness (Zartman, 2007b, pp. 235–236) Similar to MHS and Way 
Out, the perceptions of MEO are also a necessary but insufficient condition for 
successful negotiations. MEO is a “figment perception”, which is “a subjective 
appreciation of objective elements invented of the parties and their mediator” and “is 
internal to the negotiation process not the result of an objective external situation” 
(Zartman, 2005c, p. 2)(Zartman & Kremenyuk, 2005). In order to assess the parties’ 
perception of Way Out, objective and subjective indicators should be taken into 
consideration. An objective indicator of Way Out could be “an action or statement by 
one party” (Zartman & Soto, 2010, p. 23) such as “evaluating official/ unofficial 
statements” or “ assessing preliminary signs of cooperation”. Such indicators 
highlight concrete evidence of any willingness to seek a way out (Zartman & Soto, 
2010, pp. 23–25). An example of a subjective indicator might be “the other side’s 
perception of moves as an encouragement to talk” (Zartman & Soto, 2010, p. 23). In 
order to evaluate the MEO, three indicators can be applied to the analysis: firstly, how 
do parties perceive the conflict and its causes; second, how do parties appreciate their 
interests and needs; and third, can parties or mediators design a mutual attractive 
solution (Zartman, 2005c, p. 2).  
 
The Zone of Possible Agreement (ZOPA) is “the space between the disputants’ 
minimally acceptable outcomes or ‘red lines’ and it consists of all possible crisis 
management outcomes that are both in line with the interests of each disputing side 
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and render them better off than no-deal alternatives would” (Vukovic, 2015, p. 420). 
The ZOPA is a dynamic negotiation range and its existence depends on whether or not 
there is a potential outcome that would benefit both parties more than a situation of 
non-agreement. In order to identify the ZOPA by either disputant parties or willing 
mediators, it is necessary to identify each party’s “bottom line”, “red line” or “walk 
away positions” should they fail to reach a negotiated agreement. The ZOPA is 
therefore the overlapping space between all parties “red lines”. The concept of 
BATNA (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement) reflects the “best course of 
action” that a party could take in place of a mutually beneficial agreement (Fisher & 
Ury, 2011). The BATNA is slightly different from the predetermined and 
unchangeable bottom line which is more flexible and possible for innovation. A larger 
ZOPA at the outset of a negotiation increases the chances that a crisis will end in 
agreement rather than war, expansion of this ZOPA during the course of the 
negotiations seems to decrease the probability of agreement (Wilkenfeld, 2006, p. 
159). The reason behind this unexpected statement due to the expansion of initial 
ZOPA provides negotiators multiple options and thus increases the difficulty to 
coordinate a single solution. Bateman argues that “sovereignty disputes and maritime 
boundaries in the South China Sea will not be resolved in the foreseeable future” 
(Bateman, 2011). Hence, it is necessary for claimant countries or mediators to seek 
the functional cooperation and management in place of seeking agreement on 
boundaries(Bateman, 2011). A ZOPA may not exist or be recognized by disputants at 
the beginning of negotiations but may instead be created or identified during the 
negotiation process.  
 
The link between the ZOPA and Ripeness theory is the Way Out and MEO, especially 
in the agreement phase of negotiation. The existence of a ZOPA is one of the objective 
elements of Way Out and MEO that demonstrates the promising possibility for parties 
searching for conflict resolution by negotiation. The identified ZOPA could be the 
positive element that stimulates disputants to perceive the Way Out and further MEOs. 
Mediators may also play a role here, adding a third, outside perspective to help 
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identify or create a ZOPA and aid parties in realizing the Way Out and MEO. The 
analysis of ZOPA will focus on the “setup” and “deal design”, especially the parties, 
interests, and no-deal options in the context of potential deals rather than the tactical 
dimension (K.Sebenius & K.Singh, 2013, p. 57). The important step is to clarify the 
actual “red line” for each party and to seek a potential agreement zone rather than the 
no deal option. Different parties may have diverse perceptions of where the real “red 
line” lies for both themselves and their opponents and it is therefore important to 
scrutinize the gap between two parties’ perceptions in order to determine the location 
of the real “red line”. Sanctions and incentives (sticks and carrots) will also affect the 
range of the ZOPA. Mediators with leverage will be able to more profoundly affect 
bargaining zones than those lacking such power (Wilkenfeld, 2006, p. 160). Therefore, 
in order to identify if disputants in SCS conflicts have any overlapping interests and 
determine if a ZOPA can be identified, this paper will include a detailed discussion 
about the differences among parties’ positions, interests and needs in order to detect 
the actual interests that parties will promote.  
 
Even though the U.S. is not one of claimant states directly involved in SCS disputes, 
it has great influence on the conflict resolution as an outside player, especially 
contesting its interests and position with China. As the only hegemonic power in the 
Post-Cold War period, the U.S. is the only party with the military capability to counter 
China’s increasing naval strength and block China’s assertive demands in the SCS (To, 
2003, p. 27). Therefore, Power is the other vital concept to analyze negotiation 
behavior in SCS disputes. The dominant school holds the view that “power symmetry 
is the condition most propitious for mutually satisfying negotiations and efficient 
attainment of optimal results” (Zartman, 2007a, p. 100). However, this is not always 
the case; In some cases, symmetry is a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
successful negotiations (Pfetsch & Landau, 2000, p. 40). Zartman and Rubin (2000) 
argue that “equal power or (perceptions thereof) does not lead to more effective 
negotiation than unequal power” (Zartman & Rubin, 2000, p. 272). The stalemate 
between China and the U.S. is partially due to their power symmetry leading to a 
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deadlock. In the case of China and the U.S., high-power symmetry “allows each party 
to hold the other in check” (Zartman & Rubin, 2000, p. 272). This symmetric power 
creates a lot of hurdles in identifying the ZOPA because it encourages the parties to 
perceive a no-deal option as the best option; both parties lock themselves into the 
impasse rather than chase an agreement because “both acted with high self-perception 
of power towards the other” (Zartman & Rubin, 2000, p. 277). In asymmetrical power 
relations, “the distribution of power resources can lead to threats or pressure from one 
side upon another” (Pfetsch & Landau, 2000, p. 26) Therefore, changing the power 
balance may induce ripeness by helping parties perceive the Way Out and MEO or by 
enhancing the MHS. Based on cost-benefit logic, if a party senses the threats or 
pressure, it will prepare to seek an alternative solution that is more advantageous. On 
the other hand, if one party applies more pressure or threats to the other party, the 
stronger the pain the other party will feel, increasing the salience of the MHS. Power 
asymmetry produces diverse negotiation attitudes. The stronger party utilizes its 
power and usually adopts the strategy “take it or leave it” (Zartman & Rubin, 2000, p. 
276) to push the weaker part to compromise. If the weaker party shows hesitation, 
then the stronger party will employ the strategy of “take it or suffer” to increase the 
pressure, thus approaching the weaker party’s security point (Zartman & Rubin, 2000, 
p. 276). The asymmetry in power will at least enhance the weaker party’s perception 
of hurting stalemate.  
 
As one of the popular conflict management methods, third party mediation is another 
attempt to solve the SCS disputes. If there are a lack of objective indicators of MHS 
or Way Out, “ripening may involve an even more active engagement of the mediator” 
(Zartman, 2003). Mediation represents a form of “assisted negotiation” (Vuković, 
2015, p. 10) which should be understood as a “political process with no advance 
commitment from the parties to accept mediator’s ideas” (Zartman & Touval, 2007, p. 
437). Third party mediators “can develop a policy of ripening, cultivating both 
objective and subjective elements of ripeness if these elements do not appear on their 
own” (Zartman & Soto, 2010, p. 7) There are several advantages to accept mediation: 
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“parties could use mediation as a convenient political cover for making unpopular 
decisions”, mediators could help boost the mutual understandings of disputants by 
helping them clarify each party’s real interests and preferences, “mediators can use 
their tangible and intangible resources in order to increase the costs of ongoing 
conflict, improve the attractiveness of a negotiated settlement and incentivize the 
parties to be more amenable to compromise” amongst others. (Vuković, 2015, p. 18) 
At the same time, Pfetsch& Landau argue that “symmetric relationship is a 
precondition for a third party to be accepted as a facilitator, arbiter or mediator in a 
negotiation process” ( Pfetsch& Landau, 2000, p. 36). It is obvious that ASEAN is not 
an equidistant mediator that does not have equal engagement with each other party. 
China’s increasing power also amplifies the unbalanced relationship between China 
and ASEAN.  
 
Hypothesis 6: When the U.S. increases its military presence/ or uses military 
deterrence in the South China Sea, their action will actually narrow the ZOPA because 
their action almost reaches China’s “red line”.  
 
Hypothesis 7: The no-deal option in the South China Sea conflict is favored by both 
China and the U.S. in the situation of a 4-S stalemate.  
 
Hypothesis 8: As China’s hard power increases, both economically and militarily, the 
possibility of solving the South China Sea conflict through the multilateral ASEAN- 
Way decreases. 
 
Hypothesis 9: China’s willingness to negotiate SCS disputes will determine the range 
of ZOPA. Willingness is a salient variable but not the only factor.  
 
4.2 Methodology  
This research will combine political discourse analysis, process-tracing and case 
studies qualitative methods in a complementary approach. Based on the 
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“causes-of-effects” approach, one of the central aims of qualitative research is to 
illustrate the results in individual cases and thus “identify the causes of these specific 
outcomes for each and every case that falls within the scope of the theory under 
investigation” (Mahoney & Goertz, 2006, p. 230). By comparison, following the 
“effects-of-causes” logic, quantitative research methods “seek to estimate the average 
effect of one or more causes across a population of case” (Mahoney & Goertz, 2006, p. 
230). Although both methods have their advantages to explain political phenomena, 
qualitative research methods are more suitable for examining the predicament of SCS 
disputes, particularly as they offer elaborated reasons for what factors will affect 
Ripeness in SCS disputes. Due to the complexity of the SCS disputes and the 
presence of a large number of subjective variables in the analysis, it is hard to 
quantify and generalize the variables.  
 
Political Discourse Analysis (or PDA) is the analysis of political discourse from a 
critical perspective, a perspective which focuses on the reproduction and contestation 
of political power through political discourse (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2013, p. 17). 
Therefore, PDA does not only focus on the political discourse analysis but also critical 
enterprise (Dijk, 1997, p. 11). Officials and politicians are not the only targets of PDA; 
the term ‘political discourse’ can be extended into practices by “all participants in the 
political process” (Dijk, 1997, p. 13). In this research, in order to identify the core 
elements of Ripeness theory such as MHS, WO and MEO, the indispensible step is to 
scrutinize each party’s perceptions. One efficient way to examine the disputants’ 
perceptions is to analyze the political discourse beyond the public speeches delivered 
by political leaders or officials, or media information related to the SCS issues. PDA 
of relevant documents, government announcements and public speeches delivered by 
each party’s leaders will help to establish a solid understanding of each party’s 
interests and the underlying meanings and motivations behind state actions. It is 
important to adopt a critical view in PDA as occasionally government statements or 
public speeches may diverge from the actual intentions or practical action of parties.  
Process Tracing is a method that “attempts to identify the intervening causal process 
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- the causal chain and causal mechanism - between an independent variable (or 
variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable” (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 
206). In essence, “process tracing” refers to the examination of intermediate steps in a 
process to make inferences and hypotheses on how that process took place and 
whether and how it generated the outcome of interest (Bennett & Checkel, 2014, p. 7). 
Process tracing is an appropriate methodological tool to track the dynamic nature of 
SCS disputes, able to scrutinize the cause and effect relationships between 
independent variables and dependent variables of hypotheses. Testing whether the 
MHS, WO and MEO exist in SCS disputes is a complicated process that demands 
testing of both objective and subjective indicators, especially how the dynamic of 
these indicators affects the outcomes. Process tracing is a useful tool to track events 
within a particular conflict and supply the inferential leverage. In this manner it is 
capable of detecting the causal mechanism of conflicts and as such could be applied to 
the Scarborough Shoal standoff between China and the Philippines in 2012.  
 
This research will also use the small-n case studies method. Case studies “as a useful 
means could closely examine the hypothesized role of casual mechanisms in the 
context of individual cases; and their capacity for addressing casual 
complexity”(George & Bennett, 2005, p. 27). There is one case selected in this 
research: 
 
China vs. Philippines  
In 2013, the Philippines submitted for arbitration a claim against China for violation 
of UNCLOS after more than a decade of unsuccessful bilateral and multilateral 
negotiations over territorial claims in the South China Sea (Kingdon, 2015, p. 129). 
This case demonstrates the Philippines reliance on international law frameworks to 
solve the disputes. In addition, the U.S. and the Philippines updated a defense pact in 
2014 which is an addition to the Mutual Defense Treaty since 1951 amid rising 
tensions between China and its neighbors. Through this case, the research could also 
evaluate U.S.’s role in the South China Sea. How does the outside player affect the 
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South China Sea disputes?  
 
The in-depth single case study will provide holistic and complete observation of 
complex SCS disputes. The limitations of case studies falls on the dilemma between 
“achieving high internal validity and good explanations of particular cases” versus 
“making generalizations that apply to broad populations” (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 
32). It is difficult to reach a generalized conclusion by using case study method. Even 
the refined case study about China vs. the Philippines may not offer an explanatory 
pattern that applies to other cases. During the research, potential pitfalls may exist in 
the case selection procedure. China vs. the Philippines case representative of the most 
assertive claimants in SCS disputes in some of the more severe military 
confrontations and negotiation attempts. 
 
Data collection for this research will include academic books, journal articles, 
relevant inter-governmental agreements (bilateral and multilateral), international law 
provisions and speeches from relevant countries as sources for analysis. When 
selecting academic books or journal articles, I will try to avoid bias. Particularly in 
Chinese academic circles there are many articles that represent the government’s 
stance with propagandistic characteristics. While it is not easy to distinguish the 
neutrality of some core information, I will try to avoid selecting bias and compare 
information with books and journal articles from non-Chinese academia. In 2002, 
both China and ASEAN signed the DOC, which is widely regarded as a turning point 
in SCS conflict management attempts. As such, the research will focus on the time 
period that followed, namely 2002-2015.  
 
5. Overview of the Philippines and China Disputes in SCS 
 
The claims of the Philippines are not expanded to the overall islands in SCS, but 
rather to the majority of the Spratlys. Their claim not includes the “Parcel Islands or 
Spratly Island itself but several islands in that immediate vicinity” (Robert W.Smith, 
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2010, p. 227). As the first batch of littoral countries in Asia, the Philippines proposed 
to extend its maritime jurisdiction over its territorial sea via enacting national laws to 
explicitly announce the delimitation of its territorial sea and its entitlements over the 
archipelagic waters, continental shelf and EEZ (Wu, 2013, p. 124). In 2009 the 
Philippines enacted Republic Act No. 9522, which clarified it has right to exercise 
sovereignty and jurisdiction over a “regime of islands”, namely the “Kalayaan Island 
Group” and “Scarborough Shoal” (Huangyan Island in Chinese)(Congress of the 
Philippines, 2009). Although the Philippines have disputes with other claimant parties 
such as Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia in Scarborough Shoal and 
its adjacent waters, the major conflicts are with China on Mischief Reef, Scarborough 
Shoal and Reed Bank.  
 
The most salient maritime conflict between the Philippines and China started late in 
1994 when China occupied Mischief Reef by building a series of structures including 
a fishermen’s shelter. The Philippines and China have held bilateral consultations on 
SCS issues but with slow and insignificant progress due to the Philippines reluctance 
to enter into bilateral negotiations under Chinese pressure over the joint development 
of the overlapping area or on the condition of shelving the sovereignty issues (M. J. 
Valencia, 1995, p. 46). From the Philippine policy makers’ prospective, the 
occupation revealed “the limitations of diplomacy and prompted discussion of the 
need for military modernization” (CRISIS, 2012, p. 6). Small-scale conflicts between 
the Philippines and China happened from time to time between the 1995-2001. These 
conflicts were mainly between Chinese fishing boats and the Philippine navy or naval 
ship confrontations between the two countries. During this period, both countries 
maintained “low-key but frequent high-level contacts and official visits” (Wu, 2013, p. 
135). In 2002, China and ASEAN countries signed the DOC, which brought hope that 
the SCS disputes could be ended in a peaceful way by creating a formal code of 
conduct. During the Philippines’ president Arroyo’s term (2001-2010), enhanced 
bilateral economic relationships eased the tension between the two countries. The 
most notable leap in progress occurred in 2005 when the Philippines and China signed 
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the Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking (JMSU) agreement. JMSU was not only 
China’s diplomatic effort to maintain good relations with the Philippines for the 
purpose of resolving tension in the SCS but was also dovetailed with the Philippines’ 
demands to promote economic growth and ensure energy security (De Guzman, 2004, 
p. 73). This agreement highlighted a greater willingness for both parties to cooperate 
in fields that not refer to the sensitive sovereignty issue. Both parties share common 
interests in economic, research and technological fields. The same year, the 
Philippines and China signed two agreements aimed at fostering better military and 
security cooperation (International Business Publications, 2009, p. 42) which also 
indicated a positive leap in bilateral relations. Closer economic cooperation created a 
spillover effect that benefitted higher level political cooperation.  
 
Nonetheless, when President Benigno Aquino III took office in 2010, the Philippines 
changed its diplomatic tone, shifting toward hard line confrontational policies in 
regards to SCS issues. The tension between the Philippines and China has been 
gradually rising since the sovereignty issue surpassed economics as the focal concern 
for the Philippines. With this shift in focus of state interests, the range of the ZOPA is 
narrowed. In 2011, a Chinese frigate allegedly fired warning shots at a Philippine 
vessel when it approached the area near Jackson Atoll in the Spratly Islands (CNAS, 
2013). In May 2011, Philippine President Aquino III warned the Chinese defense 
minister of a possible arms race, stating that “We may not have the capability now, but 
that might force us to increase our capabilities also” (Agence France-Presse, 2011). 
Also in 2011, a Philippine naval ship rammed a Chinese fishing boat near Reed Bank 
(CNAS, 2013). The Philippine Navy apologized to China and addressed it as a “minor 
incidence” which caused “no damage or casualties” in order to ease tensions after a 
series of disputes earlier that year (Reuters, 2011). Although the Philippines is in a 
relatively weak position to pursue its demands due to its limited military capability, 
the Philippine government started to “ratchet up diplomatic efforts”, “ accelerate 
military procurement” and rename the SCS to the “West Philippine Sea” in all official 
communications (CRISIS, 2012, p. 7). In 2012, the Philippines and China engaged in 
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a two-month standoff at Scarborough shoal. Furthermore, the Philippines unilaterally 
laid a case before the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague in 2013 against 
China’s maritime claims in SCS.  
 
So far, the overall maritime dispute between the Philippines and China has been both 
intractable and destructive. The start of disagreements can be dated back to 1949 
when the Chinese Republican legation in Manila informed the Philippine government 
that China was garrisoning Itu Aba (Wu, 2013, p. 130). Through to 2015 the dispute 
remained active and the stalemate became even more protracted after the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration in The Hague ruled that it had the jurisdiction to hear the case but 
China refused to participate. The lingering dispute between the Philippines and China 
has become self-reinforcing; both parties are becoming more assertive in their claims, 
which only create more hurdles to settle the disputes. There is no doubt that the 
identity denigration in the Philippine and China dispute is noticeable. Especially from 
the Philippines side, the government intentionally links the maritime disputes with 
nationalism by portraying itself as a “victim” to stir up domestic patriotism. While the 
“profitability” is not obvious for both disputant parties, when the Philippines filed a 
lawsuit against China’s claims in SCS it gained support from Vietnam, Malaysia and 
Australia whilst simultaneously strengthening relations with the U.S. A lack of 
ripeness is another indispensible and important index of an intractable conflict that 
will be elaborated in the following in-depth case studies: the 2012 Scarborough shoal 
standoff and the Philippines suing of China in 2013.   
 
5.1 The Scarborough Shoal Standoff: A Fleeting Opportunity for Dispute Resolution? 
 
5.1.1 Each Party’s Interests in SCS  
Between April 10th and June 15th 2012, the Philippines and China engaged in a two 
month standoff in the disputed Scarborough Shoal. This unprecedented face-off was 
the “proverbial tipping point brought about by China’s coercive moves in the disputed 
area particularly its maritime brinkmanship stratagem against the Philippines” (De 
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Castro, 2013, p. 2). This standoff also embroiled U.S. power into the bilateral disputes 
between the Philippines and China. The Scarborough Shoal (Huangyan Island in 
Chinese) forms a triangle-shaped chain of reefs and rocks located in the north of the 
Spratly Islands, 124 nautical miles from the Philippine’s main island of Luzon (De 
Castro, 2015, p. 117) and within the 200 nautical mile EEZ declared by the 
Philippines. China claims it has “indisputable sovereignty” over the Scarborough 
Shoal, while the Philippines declare the Scarborough Shoal is an “integral part” of 
Philippine territory, including the resources within the EEZ and the continental shelf.  
 
As a littoral country, the Philippines clearly expressed that its interest in Scarborough 
Shoal is to protect the integrity of its sovereignty and maritime entitlements. As one of 
the Three Pillars of Philippines Foreign Policy, “preservation and enhancement of 
national security” (Romulo, 2011) plays an important role in defining their interests in 
SCS. Once their security in the SCS is threatened, it is a dangerous move to 
undermine their national interests. When the Philippines’ president Aquino III took 
power, his administration discarded his predecessor’s policy of balancing the great 
powers and shifted polices to build a closer security relationship with the U.S. that 
unavoidably strained Philippine-China bilateral relations (De Castro, 2016, p. 324). 
Thus, the Philippines’s actual interests in the SCS are not to develop their economy or 
maintain a balanced relationship with China. On the contrary, their actual interests are 
to defend territorial integrity and maintain a good relationship with the U.S.  
 
China insists it has indisputable sovereignty over the SCS and described the dispute in 
the Spratlys as one of its “core interests”. In contrast to the Philippines, China has 
never clarified what exactly it demands within the ambiguous “nine-dash line”. China 
labels its rising power as a “peaceful rising” and has demonstrated a willingness to be 
a “responsible stakeholder”. However, its growing assertiveness in SCS and 
modernizing military power has triggered a threatening perception among 
neighboring countries. This is especially as controlling the SCS could fulfill China’s 
rising energy demands and secure a number of trade and energy transportation routes. 
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Furthermore, by defending its interests in SCS, China could also counterbalance the 
influence of the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific region, especially offsetting U.S. Navy 
presence in the Strait of Malacca (Zhou, 2015). Overall, China’s core interests in the 
SCS involve sovereignty, energy security and national security.  
 
As early as 2010, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Vietnam and 
highlighted the national interests of the U.S., namely “freedom of navigation, freedom 
of over flight, open access to Asia’s maritime commons, a collaborative diplomatic 
process to resolve territorial disputes and respect for international law in the South 
China Sea” (Clinton, 2010). The Obama administration’s “rebalancing” Asia-Pacific 
strategy revolves around several fundamental interests of the U.S., particularly a 
“strengthening of relationships with allies and partners”, embedding the U.S. into 
regional architecture, enhancing the relationship with ASEAN and maintaining a 
positive and stable relationship with China (Bader, 2014). Therefore, the U.S.’s 
interests in the SCS include free and unhindered access to the SCS, maintaining peace 
and stability in the region, performing duties to its allies in Asia Pacific, maintaining 
cooperative relationships with China and maintaining a neutral position on 
sovereignty issues over the disputed features.  
 
5.1.2 The Philippines’ ASEAN Attempt  
Prior to the Scarborough shoal standoff, the Philippines actually actively sought a 
multilateral platform to settle the dispute in the SCS, especially through the regional 
fora ASEAN. During the 2010 ASEAN Summit in Hanoi, the Philippines President 
Aquino III stated that “maintaining peace and stability in the SCS is of paramount 
concern to the Philippines”, “the Philippines aspires to transform this area into a zone 
of peace, friendship, freedom, and cooperation through collaborative diplomatic 
processes to resolve territorial disputes with all parties”(Aquino III, 2010). The 
Philippine department of foreign affairs (DFA) urged all claimant parties to clarify the 
maritime boundary in SCS, thus transforming the disputed areas into “ special 
enclaves” for joint developments (CRISIS, 2012, p. 8). These ideas were incorporated 
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into their proposal to the ASEAN Summit.  
 
However, this proposal failed to gain much support from ASEAN members; China in 
particular preferred to solve the dispute through bilateral negotiations or dialogues 
rather than bring the issue to the multilateral level. During the 2012 ASEAN Summit 
in Cambodia, the Philippines and Vietnam proposed that ASEAN should resist 
China’s bilateral approach of handling the SCS dispute and at the same time announce 
ASEAN’s official position on the SCS issue. However, as China’s intimate ally, the 
host country Cambodia blocked any SCS issues over the course of the summit. 
Cambodian Foreign Minister Hor Namhong explained that the lack of SCS dispute 
discussion in the joint communiqué was due to “some member countries repeatedly 
insisted to put the issue of the Scarborough Shoal”, “the meeting of the ASEAN 
foreign ministers is not a court, a place to give a verdict about the dispute” (BBC, 
2012).  
 
During this period, only the Philippines seemed to sense the necessity of solving the 
disputes; other claimant countries (excluding Vietnam) were relatively reluctant to 
discuss the disputes. China and the Philippines found themselves entrapped in a 4-S 
stalemate rather than a MHS. It is clear that any sufficient level of ripeness in the 
dispute was missing when the Philippines brought the issue to ASEAN at the time. Of 
course, a capable and active mediator can cultivate MHS or WO to assist the parties in 
recognizing the negotiation opportunity. However, in this case, ASEAN failed to do so 
due to the asymmetrical power relations between ASEAN members and China. The 
ASEAN way of conflict management refers to “a series of established guidelines and 
norms” and places “a premium on dialogue and consultation” (Majumdar, 2015, pp. 
73–74). It is difficult for all members in ASEAN to achieve consensus with such 
divergent interests for each member and a lack of any collective identity. China 
demonstrated an unquestionable capability to influence the ASEAN agenda during the 
2012 ASEAN Summit by pressuring Cambodia to block the SCS issue. For China, 
bringing the disputes to the multilateral platform would internationalize the SCS 
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disputes, and clarifying its claims in the SCS is not consistent with its interests. In the 
DOC, one of the important principles states that “parties undertake to exercise self- 
restraint” when any activities may “complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace” 
(ASEAN, 2012). The SCS issues were denied a place on the agenda of the 2012 
ASEAN Summit due to the potential for the Philippines’ proposal to complicate and 
escalate the dispute. This also signaled ASEAN’s lack of capability and motivation to 
offer a better option than persuading each party to abide by the norm of 
“self-restraint”. Therefore, ASEAN has failed to induce ripeness in the SCS partially 
due to a lack of capability to stimulate or alter WO or MEO perceptions of claimant 
countries. More importantly, each party’s unwillingness to negotiate SCS is the main 
obstacle of opening negotiation due to a lack of motivation to do so. The asymmetry 
of the power balance between ASEAN members and China offers limited options for 
smaller parties; under China’s pressure smaller parties could only “take it or leave it” 
whatever China imposed on them. With China’s increasing hard power, China could 
use its muscle to affect the SCS issue. As long as China insists on dealing with SCS 
disputes solely through bilateral approaches, the possibility of solving the disputes in 
the multilateral ASEAN-Way is severely decreased.  
 
5.1.3 A Fleeting Chance to Ripe the Disputes  
The Scarborough Shoal standoff began on April 8th, 2012, when a Philippine Navy 
surveillance plane discovered eight Chinese fishing vessels in a lagoon around the 
disputed shoal. On April 10th, in accordance with the established Rules of 
Engagement, the Philippine Navy (PN) deployed its largest warship to the shoal, the 
‘BRP Gregorio del Pilar’ (De Castro, 2015, p. 118). According to a report from 
accompanying inspection team, the Chinese fishing vessels contained large numbers 
of illegally collected maritime resources, such as corals, sharks and other wildlife 
(DFA, 2012). The DFA announced that the Chinese finishing vessels represented “a 
serious violation of the Philippines’ sovereignty and maritime jurisdiction. The 
poaching of endangered marine resources is in violation of the Fisheries Code and the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna 
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(CITES)” (DFA, 2012). Although it was not the first time that the Philippines found 
and deterred illegal entry of Chinese fishing vessels, surprisingly, two Chinese 
surveillance ships intentionally placed themselves between the PN flagship and the 
Chinese fishing ships to prevent the arrest of Chinese fishermen. At the same time, the 
Chinese side also informed the captain of the BRP Gregorio del Pilar that he had 
strayed into China’s territory (De Castro, 2015, p. 118).  
 
Although there is no solid evidence to show that the Chinese fishing vessels had 
official connections with Chinese military, China has been accused of using its fishing 
vessels as proxies for its Navy, particularly as it barely restrains vessels from 
operating in disputed areas (Miks, 2012). On April 12th, in order to control escalating 
tensions the Philippines replaced the BRP Gregorio del Pilar with a smaller 
coastguard vessel. Although to some degree the Philippines thus made a concession to 
China, it never relinquished the idea of borrowing power to balance China’s influence. 
 
On April 16th, the U.S. and the Philippines conducted their annual Balikatan military 
exercise amid the standoff. Even though the Philippines officials announced that the 
annual military exercise by no means linked to the impasse or aimed to provoke China 
(Whaley, 2012), the same day China urged the Philippines to withdraw all vessels 
from Scarborough Shoal. On April 20th, China deployed its most advanced fishery 
patrol ship, Yuzheng-310, to the disputed territorial waters in order to protect China’s 
interests (Xinhua News, 2012a).  
 
The Philippines and China indeed had diplomatic talks during the long-brewing 
tensions of April 2012. However, both parties firmly insisted that the Scarborough 
Shoal was part of their indisputable territory, and a mutual lack of trust prevented any 
possible negotiation. The Philippine Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario stated that 
"the ambassador of China took the view that they have full sovereignty over the 
Scarborough Shoal… So, in a sense, we had reached an impasse in terms of our 
positions. And so there's a real challenge for us in terms of our agreement to keep on 
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talking today" (Hookway, 2012). Soon after, the Philippines halted any further 
diplomatic talks with China on the Scarborough Shoal standoff and accused Chinese 
Ambassador Ma Keqing of delivering “incomplete, inaccurate, and misleading” 
information about the agreements made in the course of the discussions to Beijing 
(SINA, 2012). Del Rosario mentioned that "I said... there was no agreement that's 
why we are on a stalemate," "They are harping that we don't honor an agreement... I 
felt I should clarify that with the Chinese government, it seems that report was not 
accurate, not factual" (SINA, 2012). Meanwhile, the Chinese government argued that 
the Philippines unilaterally violated an agreement to withdraw its vessels from the 
disputed waters.  
 
The failure of these diplomatic attempts escalated the tension in the disputed waters, 
with both disputant parties’ increasing the assertiveness of their claims. On May 7th, 
Vice Foreign Minister Fu Ying summoned Alex Chua, Charge D'affaires of the 
Philippine Embassy in China to make a serious representation over the current 
incident. Fu Ying criticized the Philippine side, suggesting it “has not realized that it 
is making serious mistakes and instead is stepping up efforts to escalate tension”, and 
had “repeatedly made erroneous remarks” (PH.China Embassy, 2012). Meanwhile, 
although the optimal option for China is to seek diplomatic solutions, Fu Ying 
stressed that China is not “optimistic about the situation” thus “the Chinese side has 
also made all preparations to respond to any escalation of the situation by the 
Philippine side” (PH.China Embassy, 2012) The Philippines threatened to bring the 
dispute to the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea, but this was rejected by 
Chinese officials who insisted that only bilateral diplomatic talks could fix the 
disputes (De Castro, 2013, p. 5).  
 
At the beginning of the standoff, only the Philippines perceived a hurting stalemate. 
China changed its usual low key policy to be more assertive and sent the surveillance 
ships to prevent the Philippines approaching to Chinese fishing boats. By also 
informing the captain of the BRP Gregorio del Pilar that the Philippines had infringed 
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on Chinese sovereignty, China clearly indicated its new affirmative stance. China’s 
message to some degree deterred the Philippines; they swapped the warship with a 
smaller coastguard vessel, demonstrating that the Philippines felt the deadlock was 
painful and was forced to change its strategy. Plus, the potential for impending 
catastrophe if China were to take military action against the Philippines also served to 
increase the Philippines’ perception of hurting stalemate. It wasn’t until the U.S. and 
the Philippines launched their annual military exercise near the disputed area that 
China also became aware of the hurting stalemate. However, the stalemate was not 
intense enough for China to take steps toward negotiation. On the contrary, China 
placed a more advanced patrol ship in the disputed area. With the U.S.’s involvement, 
the relatively symmetric power between China and the U.S. locked all parties into a 
4-S stalemate where each party held the other in check.  
 
Even when the Philippines and China undertook diplomatic talks during the standoff, 
there were no clearly demonstrated elements of “ripeness”. For instance, both parties 
felt different degrees of MHS and perceived it at different times. Still, the Philippines 
perceived a stronger hurting stalemate than China did, by stating that they had 
“reached impasse” and describing the situation as “a real challenge”. The alternative 
option for the Philippines was to resort to the U.S.; for China it was to increase its 
military presence. Both parties never changed their stubborn tone on the sovereignty 
issues and remained insistent on their claims. It seems that both of them had the same 
“red line” or “walk away position” and therefore no ZOPA could be identified in this 
bilateral talk. In addition, the high level of mutual distrust destroyed the bilateral 
diplomatic channel. There was no WO for either party, only mutual accusations. 
Neither the Philippines nor China perceived negotiation as the best possible way to 
solve the disputes. The Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary directly pointed out that 
there was “no agreement” which was why the talk ended up in “stalemate”. China’s 
attitudes only became more assertive, criticizing the Philippines for making “serious 
mistakes”. Furthermore, China also perceived there may be no negotiated WO and 
prepared to respond to “any escalation of the situation”.  
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During the first attempt of negotiation, a lack of ripeness made the bilateral 
diplomatic efforts fail. However, ripeness is not the only reason why the diplomatic 
efforts were ineffective. Trust is another vital element that has powerful influence 
over the opening of negotiation. Because both China and the Philippines mistrusted 
each other so greatly, the diplomatic channel was shut down. The lack of MHS can be 
clearly identified when the Philippines changed their warship to smaller vessels, but 
China did not perceive a hurting stalemate at that time. When the U.S. got involved in 
the disputes, the closer relationship between the Philippines and the U.S. increased the 
relative cost to China. But due to the power symmetry between China and the U.S., 
this relative cost was not salient enough to enhance China’s subjective perception of 
MHS.  
 
5.1.4 Carrots or Sticks? Why Didn’t the Sanction Work?  
Accordingly, still without officially announcing the trade sanction related to the 
Scarborough standoff, China employed economic “sticks” to pressure the Philippines. 
The Chinese General Administration of Quality Supervision questioned the qualities 
of imported fruits from the Philippines and banned imports. Some scholars described 
this trade suspension in the name of “quarantine concerns” as “ the China-Philippine 
Banana War” (The Asia Sentinel, 2012). At the same time, most Chinese travel 
agencies have suspended travel to the Philippines due to so called “security concerns” 
(Xinhua News, 2012b) The Philippine’s Socio-economic Planning Secretary Arsenio 
Balisacan said China’s fruit ban will only have “modest effects” on the Philippines, 
and the travel advisory “Is not something that will cripple out tourism industry at this 
point” (Esmaquel II, 2012). However, in contrast to the Philippine official’s reaction, 
Filipino businessmen did sense huge losses to the fallout of the crisis. The president 
of Philippine Banana Growers and Exporters Association Stephen Antig commented 
“We are being bullied… with 70 percent of bananas exported to China, a lengthy ban 
could affect the livelihoods of half a million Filipinos” (South China Morning Post, 
2012).  
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Despite this, the Philippines government still insisted that China’s use of economic 
leverage will only have “modest effect” on their economy. In reality, the business 
sector felt “bullied”, since the Philippines have long maintained close trade links with 
China. Although China is the third-largest trading partner of the Philippines, its 
economic sanctions have limited influence on the Philippines economy. According to 
Ravindran (2012)’s research, the most efficient economic leverage China has is 
import restrictions on primary products such as fruits or the tourist industry, however, 
the opportunity cost for China implementing certain kinds of sanctions would be very 
high (Ravindran, 2012, p. 118) China’s economic sanctions were unable to trigger the 
MHS since the relative cost for each party remained low. At the same time, China’s 
economic sanction narrowed down the range of ZOPA in negotiations.  
 
Following China’s issued warning over the disputed waters, on May 11th, the 
Philippine Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin confirmed that even without taking 
sides in the dispute the United States had promised to protect the Philippines from 
attacks in the West Philippine Sea (South China Sea) in accordance with the 1951 
mutual defense treaty (Agence France-Presse, 2012). On  May 15th, the USS North 
Carolina (SSN777), a new U.S. nuclear powered submarine arrived in Subic Bay near 
Scarborough (Kwok, 2012). The timing of what was actually a routine visit implied 
that the U.S. firmly backed the security of the Philippines. On June 4th, the Philippines 
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) stated that “two Chinese maritime vessels and 
our BFAR (Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources) vessel are no longer in the 
lagoon" while Presidential Spokesman Edwin Lacierda said in a briefing that the 
pullout was a "way forward" (Global Security, 2012). On the 8th of June, the 
Philippine President Aquino III met U.S. president Obama and Secretary of State 
Clinton, and both parties confirmed to enhance U.S.-Philippine bilateral relations. For 
the U.S., the Philippines is considered a “close friend and a key economic and 
security partner”(The White House, 2012). President Aquino III welcomed the U.S. 
strategic re-balance in Asia Pacific Region and both parties underscored the 
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importance of a collaborative diplomatic process to resolve SCS disputes, especially 
through a Code of Conduct which ASEAN and China are currently negotiating (The 
White House, 2012).  
 
Compared to China, the Philippines are vulnerable and without strong military muscle, 
but it borrowed U.S. power to balance China’s influence. The U.S. commitment to 
protect the national security of the Philippines and the presence of U.S. military 
power in nearby waters effectively deterred China, who began to feel the hurting 
stalemate and evacuated two vessels. However, while the Philippines perceived the 
pullout as a “way forward”, China did not perceive a WO or MEO. Reversely, the 
closer relationship of the Philippines and the U.S. created a dilemma, where the 
suddenly equal power did not lead to more efficient negotiations. The triangular 
relationship between the U.S., China and the Philippines fell into the trap of a 4-S 
stalemate again. The dispute remains stable and soft because of the balancing power 
of the U.S. At the same time, the dispute is self-serving, due to the huge 
disagreements between China and the Philippines. The no-deal option is favored by 
both China and the U.S. in the case of a 4-S stalemate. When the U.S. increases its 
military presence or using military deterrence in the disputed waters, their action will 
actually narrow the ZOPA because such action almost reaches China’s “red line” to 
protect its national security.  
 
5.1.5 Another Fleeting Ripeness Moment? 
The standoff in disputed waters was so salient that formal talks or negotiations were 
obviously not an option, especially accompanied with the belligerent attitude of both 
parties. Several academics mention that the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Kurt 
Campbell acted as private broker to intervene in the standoff by pressuring the 
Philippines to stand down (Goh, 2016, p. 125)(Fravel, 2014, p. 6). However, China 
denied there was even an agreement for mutual withdrawal; Chinese Vice Foreign 
Minister Fu Ying replied that “I do not know what agreement you are referring to", 
concerned that once Chinese vessels left the area, the Philippines might double-cross 
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them (Lee, 2014). Indeed, the Philippines and China resorted to backdoor negotiations 
at the end of May, but the actual mediator was not Kurt Campbell but rather 
Philippine Senator Antonio Trillanes who worked independently for President Aquino 
III. Trillanes claimed to have sixteen clandestine meetings with Chinese officials 
concerning the Scarborough matter between May and July 2012 (Lee, 2014). The 
different voices from the Philippines domestic politics also disturbed the negotiation 
results. Trillanes blamed Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario for not fulfilling his 
duty, otherwise “there wouldn’t be any need for a back channel in the first place” 
(Cabacungan, 2012). Furthermore, Trillanes argued that del Rosario “nearly brought 
us to an armed conflict with a superpower neighbor back in April and now that the 
back channel talks have enabled us to normalize our relations with China again 
without even ceding anything, he is still complaining?” (Cabacungan, 2012) On the 
one hand, del Rosario has been accused of using the standoff as leverage to cut a 
favorable deal with state-run China National Offshore Oil Corp (CNOOC) 
(Cabacungan, 2012). There was a rumor that the Philippines supposed to cooperate 
with CNOOC to co-explore the resources in disputed Reed bank. On the other hand, 
the Philippines domestic politicians did not fully trust Trillanes: since the use of secret 
diplomacy released only limited information of the negotiation details, Philippines 
Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile commented that “nobody knows what he had been 
committing to China” (Porcalla, 2012). In the end, President Aquino III said “I was 
surprised that the informal conduits ceased. There were no informal channels that 
were there before, eager to inform us what (the Chinese) wanted. They were all 
gone” (Porcalla, 2012). In the middle of June, President Aquino III ordered the 
removal of two Philippine ships in the disputed waters due to the upcoming typhoon 
season, marking the termination of two months of tense standoff. Similarly, China was 
forced to recall all its civilian fishing vessels due to the typhoon on June 18th. 
 
This back channel diplomacy was another fleeting opportunity to ripen the dispute; 
however, it was not favored by China. Content with the context of the 4-S stalemate, 
China was not willing to negotiate. Still, the Philippines side perceived the back 
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channel as a WO, especially as a “positive ripeness” MEO. According to the 
statements of Trillanes, the main failure of previous diplomatic efforts was because 
Del Rosario pushed China too much with aggressive demands that almost “brought us 
to an armed conflict”. In Trillanes view, the back channel talks were a great 
opportunity to recover a positive bilateral relationship with China; an attractive 
alternative (MEO) for the Philippines to purse its interests and improve the status quo 
even without “ceding anything”. In fact, in asymmetrical power relations, the smaller 
party must be more attentive to actions by the larger party, while the larger party’s 
concerns are principally related to the bigger picture of world affairs (Tolentino & 
Ham, 2015, p. 6) But for China as a larger power, “face” is even more important. 
When the news released that the U.S. took the broker role to arrange the back channel 
talks, China officially denied it. If this negotiation is fully confidential, the U.S. role is 
a facilitator. However, when the information was released, the U.S. turned into the 
spoiler for the non-agreement between China and the Philippines. Besides, during the 
back channel talks, it is clear that the Philippines lacked a valid spokesman capable of 
stating a unified position in a single voice. China may have been confused by the 
different positions hold by Trillanes and Del Rosario, and thus only mistrusted the 
Philippines further, fearing that the Philippines may “double-cross” them.  
 
However, the end of the Scarborough shoal standoff did not resolve the territorial 
dispute. On the contrary, China has tended to be more assertive and play a coercive 
diplomatic card since. In July 2012, China erected a rope barrier in the entrance of the 
Scarborough shoal to block access to Philippine ships. Additionally, China’s coast 
guard vessels never leave the surroundings of the disputed waters, “effectively 
militarizing its presence in the shoal” (Duke, 2015). In July, China declared its 
establishment of Sansha city, located on a disputed island chain in the SCS. Similarly, 
China also decided to militarize this new city by building a military garrison, 
indicating “a strong response to actions that China perceives to be infringements on 
its sovereignty”, however, “it will not significantly improve Chinese military 
capabilities in the SCS without substantial upgrades” (Mastro, 2012, p. 3). When 
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Chinese envoy Vice Foreign Minister Fu Ying came to the Philippines for bilateral 
talks, she reiterated China’s position on disputes, which requested the Philippines “not 
to appeal to the U.N, internationalized issue in ASEAN, not to coordinate with other 
countries such as U.S., and even not to issue press release” (WSJ, 2013).  
 
The Philippines suffers the most in this dispute and perceives the hurting stalemate 
more poignantly during the standoff. The Philippines’ attempts to internationalize the 
dispute, requesting aid from other countries and publicizing the disputes only fuelled 
its own perceptions of WO and MEO. On the contrary, the Philippines’ proposals 
were all worse for China than the no-deal option. On the on hand, the Philippines 
continued to clarify its demands and only focus on the intractable territorial disputes. 
On the other hand, China’s real intention is to blur the issue, and thus neither the 
Philippines nor the U.S.’s efforts to solve the issue managed to incentivize China into 
negotiation. In the back channel talks, there was no real ZOPA between the 
Philippines and China, due to the simple fact that they pursued goals that were 
effectively mutually exclusive. Finally, the WO and MEO disappeared from the 
Philippine’s side with President Aquino III announcing that the “informal conduits 
ceased”, “they were gone”.  
 
5.2 International Law of the Sea, a Way Out or a Deadlock? 
On January 22nd, 2013, the Philippines sent China a Note Verbale attached with the 
Notification and Statement of Claim to clarify its claims in the SCS under “Article 
287 and Annex VII of the 1982 UNCLOS” and proposed to “initiate arbitral 
proceedings to clearly establish the sovereign rights and jurisdiction of the Philippines 
over its maritime entitlements in the West Philippines” (The Philippines DFA, 2013b). 
In this Note Verbale, the Philippines addressed that their purpose to initiate arbitral 
proceedings was to “seek a peaceful and durable resolution” (The Philippines DFA, 
2013b). Unsurprisingly, China rejected the arbitration request and returned the 
Philippines’ Notification and Statement of Claim on the 19th of February. Chinese 
Foreign Ministry Spokesman Hong Lei commented that the Note Verbale “not only 
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violated the consensus enshrined in the DOC” but was also “factually flawed” (Vera 
Files, 2013). Furthermore, Hong announced that China’s position on dispute 
resolution is “through bilateral talks between the nations directly involved” (Vera 
Files, 2013). However, on March 2013, the Philippines unilaterally filled a case 
against China over competing SCS claims to the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 
The Hague.  
 
Although China reiterated on many occasions that it would only solve the dispute 
through a bilateral approach, the Philippines still perceived that they had “exhausted 
almost all political and diplomatic avenues”; “We feel the time to act is now. If we do 
not act now, we will be in default” (The Philippines DFA, 2013a). The Philippines 
officials challenged China’s statement due to the “facts” that they perceived that first, 
both countries had failed to solve the disputes through multiple bilateral consultations 
and negotiations; second, the Philippines prefers a “three-track approach of 
diplomatic, political, and legal tracks”, especially the legal track which is the “most 
durable option”; and third, the Philippines was disappointed with China’s hard line 
position of “indisputable sovereignty” by stating Philippines’s proposal is “none 
ground”, and pressuring the Philippines to “refrain from any infringement on China’s 
territorial sovereignty” (The Philippines DFA, 2013a). 
 
From the Chinese perspective, the Philippines’ legal track method is “absolutely 
unacceptable to China” (Hua, 2013). China presented two main arguments to explain 
why they rejected the Philippines’ arbitration request. First, the claims of the 
Philippines are essentially concerned with maritime delamination in the disputed SCS, 
which inevitably refers to the territorial sovereignty issues and exceeds the 
interpretation or application of UNCLOS. Second, the “Chinese government made a 
declaration in pursuance of Article 298 of UNCLOS, excluding disputes regarding 
such matters as those related to maritime delimitation from the compulsory dispute 
settlement procedures, including arbitration” (Hua, 2013). Besides, China called for 
the Philippines to abide by the DOC that states that “disputes relating to territorial and 
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maritime rights and interests be resolved through negotiations by sovereign states 
directly concerned therewith” (Hua, 2013) rather than appealing to compulsory third 
party settlement procedure.  
 
On the 29th of October 2015, the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled that the case 
was “properly constituted” under the UNCLOS, and that China’s “non-appearance” 
did not preclude the Court’s jurisdiction (PCA, 2013). The Philippines’s claims over 
the arbitration fall on three inter-related matters. First, China’s “nine-dash line” claim 
based on “historical rights” is invalid under UNCLOS. Second, it is unclear whether 
the disputed features claimed by both parties are characterized as islands, rocks, low 
tide elevations, or submerged banks under the Article 121(3) of the Convention. Third, 
that China violated the Philippines’ entitled sovereignty rights within its territorial sea, 
EEZ and continental shelf (PCA, 2013).  
 
China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs denied that the Arbitral Tribunal has jurisdiction 
and thus the Courts’ ruling on this case is “null and void” with “no binding effect on 
China” (MFA of China, 2015). Except for reasserting its “indisputable sovereignty” 
over SCS and the adjacent waters, China will not accept “any solution imposed on its 
territorial sovereignty and maritime entitlements” or “any unilateral resort to a 
third-party dispute settlement” (MFA of China, 2015). Similarly, China perceived the 
Philippines action as “a political provocation under the cloak of law” which “damages 
the basis of mutual trust” (MFA of China, 2015). As state party of UNCLOS, both the 
Philippines and China ratified UNCLOS in 1984 and 1996 respectively. However, 
based on Part XV of UNCLOS the compulsory procedures entailing binding decisions 
are not the only option for dispute settlement; parties could also seek consent-based 
peaceful settlement such as negotiation, consultation or conciliation (Yu, 2014). 
Without exhausting alternative mechanisms such as bilateral dialogues, China 
criticized the Court and the Philippines for abusing “the compulsory procedure for 
dispute settlement”(MFA of China, 2015).  
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The Philippines perceived the hurting stalemate through China’s assertive actions, but 
in fact the Philippines have already lost the control of Scarborough Shoal. Thus, the 
pain is intense enough for the Philippines to seek an alternative option. However, the 
Philippines’ unilateral action to submit the case to the Arbitral Tribunal is far beyond 
the WO or MEO for China. In the Philippines perspective, the legal track is “peaceful 
and durable solution”. However, in China’s perspective arbitration is “absolutely 
unacceptable and “null and void”. The Philippines initiated an arbitration case due to 
the support of the U.S. and its relatively weak position compared to China. The 
Philippines brinkmanship shut the door to solve the maritime disputes via bilateral 
dialogue, but the BATNA for China is to solve the issue by bilateral channel. 
Conversely, for the Philippines, the BATNA is to resort the international Law of Sea. 
Again, there is no overlapping ZOPA. In asymmetrical relationships, China could 
ignore the Arbitral Tribunal and fail to show in the Court to make the Philippines 
suffer. The Philippines’ brinkmanship is not a WO but actually deepens the deadlock 
between China. The development of the disputes between the Philippines and China 
demonstrates that the disputes are not ripe yet for negotiations.  
 
6. Conclusion  
 
The SCS disputes have long been the uncertain “security flashpoint” in the Asia 
Pacific region. Brunei, Taiwan, Malaysia, China, the Philippines and Vietnam: six 
parties compete with each other over sovereignty issues and maritime entitlements in 
the SCS. China’s rise and subsequent adoption of more assertive foreign policies 
towards SCS issues; the U.S. pivot to Asia, increasing military presence in SCS and 
strengthening military relationships with its allies in the Asia Pacific region; other 
disputant parties’ more explicitly expressing and aggressively defensing their claims: 
all these elements not only catalyze the unavoidable tensions in SCS but also increase 
the possibility of future conflicts.  
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In order to solve the SCS disputes, both claimant parties and outside stakeholders 
have gone to great efforts to solve the issues through bilateral or multilateral methods. 
Although the signing of the “Declaration on the conduct of parties in the SCS” (DOC) 
between ASEAN members and China had great potential as a promising dispute 
resolution system in the SCS, its non-binding nature did not abide by the claimant 
parties. Many existing literatures either aim to search and evaluate efficient conflicts 
solutions in SCS, such as “ASEAN way”, creating a “shared maritime regime” and 
pursuing “legal track under the UNCLOS”, or analyze the causes or power 
distributions from the perspective of International Relations theories. However, few 
literatures touch upon the key phenomenon in SCS disputes: that only limited 
negotiations were conducted among claimant parties and even less successful cases 
were achieved. Thus, this thesis applied the “Ripeness theory” formulated by 
I.William Zartman to examine the question “are the SCS disputes ripe for resolution 
or not?” The main argument is that ongoing SCS disputes are not due to the flaws of 
existing solutions but are due to the fact that the SCS disputes are not yet ripe for 
resolution. Through in-depth case study - the disputes between the Philippines and 
China during 2002 till 2015 - several key findings are identified.   
  
First of all, the disputes between the Philippines and China in SCS form a typical 
intractable and destructive conflict that has lasted for a long period of time; identity 
denigration is salient due to the sovereignty issues closely linked to patriotism in both 
counties. This dispute also has the characteristic of “profitability”: each party in these 
disputes has their own vested interests and could increase its interests as long as the 
conflict continues.  
 
Secondly, the Philippines and China were entrapped in a stable, soft and self-serving 
stalemate for the majority of the 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff. In general, the 
Philippines and China perceived different levels of the hurting stalemate, which meant 
that their perceptions were asymmetrical. At times, China did not even perceive the 
hurting stalemate during the face-off. As a smaller party in a weaker position, the 
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Philippines perceived the stronger level of MHS and were afraid of impending 
catastrophe; thus they actively pursued a WO. However, the Philippines’s first attempt 
to bring the disputes to the ASEAN platform failed due to an unwillingness of other 
ASEAN members to negotiate the issue under China’s pressure. Additionally, the 
Philippines misunderstood China’s real intentions and interests in this standoff. China 
insists in solving the disputes via bilateral dialogue with each disputant party 
individually. The WO perceived by the Philippines was internationalizing the issue, 
seeking help from the U.S. and using a legal track. However, the WOs perceived by 
the Philippines were exactly what China was opposed to, namely, China’s “walk away 
position”. Obviously, there was no enticing opportunity for China. In this sense, an 
unwillingness to negotiate became the main obstacle of opening negotiation.  
 
Thirdly, both diplomatic talks between the Philippines and China during the standoff 
failed due to a lack of full ripeness in the conflict situation. Similarly, solving the 
disputes under the UNCLOS is not a feasible option because the disputes are not ripe 
for solution either. Both parties did not perceive the hurting stalemate simultaneously. 
There was no appropriate WO or MEO identified or discovered by both parties. The 
U.S.’s involvement only enhanced the 4-S stalemate. Furthermore, the power 
asymmetry between China and the Philippines made it impossible for the Philippines 
to unilaterally seek a WO. Obviously, the no-deal option is favored by China while it 
remains entrapped in the 4-S stalemate and maintains a symmetry power balance with 
the U.S. The first time diplomatic talks happened in the April 2012, during which only 
the Philippines detected a strong hurting stalemate. There was no ZOPA identified in 
these talks due to each party reluctantly make concessions on sovereignty issues. The 
second talks utilized back channel diplomacy and failed due to the same reasons. 
Besides, lack of mutual trust and the lack of a valid spokesman in the dispute were 
also important factors affecting the negotiation results.  
 
Therefore, the SCS disputes are currently not ripe for the negotiation process due to a 
lack of MHS, feasible WO and MEO. Breakthrough may be achieved in the years 
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ahead, but only when China is willing to do so. Willingness is a threshold for a 
peaceful settlement, especially the willingness of big power. Even if the Philippines 
want a solution, there is low possibility to solve the disputes as long as there is power 
symmetry between China and the U.S. China’s willingness to solve the disputes 
depends on whether it perceives a hurting stale, impending catastrophe, way out and 
mutual enticing opportunities. The power symmetry between China and the U.S. 
keeps their power in check, so it is difficult to stimulate China’s willingness. A shift in 
the power balance will finally bring the resolution of the SCS disputes. However, it is 
still uncertain how will the power balance change thus the current disputes may 
continue to exist for a prolonged period. Besides, due to the limited negotiation 
information released in public, it is hard to identify the ZOPA due to a lack of 
information of what trade off each party has offered. In addition, the results of 
discussion may change by scrutinizing the different cases. The Philippines case 
contains several special ingredients; it is in a strong position to solve the disputes and 
it maintains a close relationship with the U.S. However, not all claimant parties utilize 
the same strategy or share the same resources. Future studies could also apply the 
ripeness theory to the other cases suggested in this paper. Finally, the SCS disputes are 
a “security flashpoint”; any unpredictable incident may change the whole picture of 
the disputes, altering the status quo as well as each claimant party’s behavior.  
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